In the international landscape of 2026, cybersecurity no longer represents merely a technical challenge for IT departments, but has become an essential and structural component of global geopolitical balances. The current world context is characterized by growing fragmentation and unpredictability involving every corner of the planet: from the persistent dynamics of the conflict in Ukraine to increasing tensions in the Middle East, up to the delicate balance between China and Taiwan and numerous other hotspots of instability spanning the globe.

In this scenario, the very nature of conflicts is undergoing a metamorphosis. Alongside the persistence and intensification of "physical" and traditional conflicts, we are witnessing an exponential growth in cyber offensives. The latter are not simple acts of digital disruption, but targeted operations aimed at the critical services of adversaries, making the digital domain a battlefield as crucial as the land or maritime fronts.

A Fragmented World: The Rise of Cyber Offensives in Modern Conflicts

The current international framework is marked by profound instability that has transformed cybersecurity into a pillar of national defense strategy. The growth of cyber offensives fits into a context of multidimensional conflicts, where the goal is not only territorial control but the paralysis of the vital functions of the opposing State.

The increase in physical conflicts has found a natural operational complement in cyberspace. Critical infrastructures — which include power grids, water systems, communications, and healthcare services — have become the primary targets of attacks designed to generate chaos and sabotage. This evolution reflects a reality where the distinction between declared war and cyber operations is no longer clear, creating an environment of constant threat that is difficult to monitor.

The Sunset of Reliability: Europe and the End of American "Coverage"

For Europe, the scenario outlined for 2026 presents extremely high risks. The main concern regards the continent's vulnerability to waves of attacks and sabotage actions, especially at a historical moment when it is no longer possible to rely on the historic "coverage" provided by the United States within the Atlantic alliance.

The strategies inaugurated by the Trump administration have acted as a destabilizing element, undermining the foundations of that alliance which European countries had considered solid and immutable for over eighty years. The speed with which international relations can change has become a defining characteristic of the new geopolitical era. As highlighted by Andy Garth, Director of Government Affairs at Eset, the ability to move from a state of friendship to a frontal clash in very short periods has made traditional partners extremely uncertain.

The tensions between the United States and its allies manifest through several channels:

• The imposition of trade tariffs.
• Direct criticism of partner policies.
• Veiled threats to territorial sovereignty (as in the case of Greenland).

In this context, the United States can no longer be considered an inherently reliable partner; there is a concrete risk that it could transform into a strategic rival.

The Danger of "Sovereignty-Washing": When Technology is Not Truly Sovereign

One of the most insidious problems for Europe lies in technological dependence on Washington. The United States effectively possesses the "master keys" to almost all digital systems used in Europe, by both private companies and public entities and private actors. This concentration of digital power creates unprecedented structural vulnerability.

A symbolic case that served as a wake-up call was the blocking of the Microsoft accounts of the International Criminal Court prosecutor, Karim Khan, following government sanctions decided by the Trump administration. This event demonstrates how the ability to deactivate a single account could potentially be extended to entire organizations or even entire European production sectors.

Thus, the phenomenon of so-called "soloyignty-washing" has emerged. Many US big tech companies, in an attempt to reassure foreign clients concerned about the loss of autonomy, propose technological and commercial solutions presented as "sovereign" or "autonomous." However, these promises risk proving fragile in the face of potential new executive orders from the US government.

The risk is that even solutions presented as sovereign will maintain critical elements — such as cybersecurity management and data processing — in the hands of the United States. This scenario opens the door to espionage or sabotage actions that are much more subtle and less evident than a declared infrastructure blockade, making the threat almost invisible yet equally devastating.

The Map of State-Sponsored Actors: Espionage, Sabotage, and Financial Crime

The global cyber warfare landscape is dominated by APT (Advanced Persistent Threat) groups, actors operating under the direct or indirect control of their respective governments. Each major power is using cyberspace to pursue different strategic objectives:

China: The Era of Industrial Espionage

Peking has massively intensified its cyber activities, but with a specific and distinct focus compared to other actors. Chinese strategy concentrates primarily on industrial espionage, aiming for the acquisition of intellectual property and technological secrets to accelerate the economic and technological development of its own country.

Russia: The Sabotage of Critical Infrastructures

Unlike China, Russian action is characterized by destructive and sabotage purposes. The main goal is to strike the critical infrastructures of adversary countries, as demonstrated by recent attack episodes that occurred in Poland. In this case, cyber warfare is used as a tool for political pressure and social destabilation through the damaging of essential services.

North Korea: Cyber-Warfare for Financial Profit

North Korea has developed a unique specialization in the global landscape. Its operations do not aim so much at espionage or political sabotage, but rather at the direct theft of capital. Its attacks are focused on financial services and platforms that manage cryptocurrencies, transforming cyber warfare into a tool for regime self-financing.

United States: Cybersecurity as Military Support

The United States uses cyber capabilities as a form of operational support to military actions or for targeted sabotage activities. Historically, this approach was evident in the use of malware such as Stuxnet and Fast1_6 to slow down the Iranian nuclear program. More recently, such capabilities have been employed in contexts related to the raid in Venezuela that led to the seizure of Nicolas Maduro.

Europe Facing the Challenge: A Dangerous Dependency

In this clash of powers, Europe finds itself in a position of extreme fragility. Not only is it less active in cyber warfare operations, but it is also decidedly less prepared to manage conflicts of this nature autonomously. Dependence on the United States concerns not only technology but also intelligence: traditional collaboration and information exchange between Western agencies have led to a substantial delegation of cyber warfare capabilities to Washington.

If Europe were to find itself in need of acting directly in a digital conflict scenario ("getting its hands dirty"), it would find itself lacking the resources necessary to sustain a confrontation with more structured global actors. The situation can be described as that of a "clay pot among iron pots," where the fragility of European infrastructures and defenses is not up to the power of the attacks it could suffer.

Toward the Era of Cyber-Corsairs: The Role of the Private Sector in Hybrid Warfare

One of the most significant evolutions of modern cyber warfare is the involvement of entities outside the governmental perimeter. The traditional model of conflict between armies is radically mutating toward a hybrid form.

Since most critical infrastructures in any nation are managed by private entities, the defense of essential services is today entrusted to technology companies. In parallel, offensive technologies — such as spyware used by intelligence agencies — are often developed by private companies.

This has given rise to the phenomenon of hybrid attacks, in which governments make use of the contribution of cybercriminals to achieve their goals. While Russia has already adopted this strategy, China has also begun to involve experts from the private sector in its espionage operations.

The expert Andy Garth compares this phenomenon to the 16th century, when governments hired privateer ships to attack the vessels of competing nations. In a modern context, transforming a penetration testing specialist into a true "cyber-corsair" would represent an enormous strategic advantage.

Although news reports have already recorded episodes where private companies collaborated with police forces to dismantle criminal infrastructures by judicial order, the expansion of this model toward scenarios of actual cyber warfare is a concrete possibility and an evolution that is already shaping the future of global conflicts.

Conclusion

2026 marks a point of no return for global security. The convergence of geopolitical instability, the unpredictability of traditional alliances, and the emergence of new actors — from state-sponsored governments to private cyber-corsairs — requires a complete redefinition of defense strategy. For Europe, the challenge is not only technological but political: finding a way to build true digital sovereignty that is not just a commercial promise, but a real and independent operational capability.